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The Promise of Precommitment in Democracy and Human Rights: The Hopeful, Forgotten 
Failure of the Larreta Doctrine  
 
Introduction 
Proposals for the international defense of democracy and human rights often collide with 
opposition from defenders of traditional conceptualizations of sovereignty and non-intervention. 
Globally, the dilemma remains salient in disagreements over the responsibility to protect (R2P), 
the promotion of democracy, and the prosecution of state leaders through the International 
Criminal Court. Though much of the debate over international protections has emerged from 
large states, the tension is perhaps most vividly experienced by small and vulnerable states. 
Weaker states often have deployed the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, effectively 
“internalizing and appropriating the international legal discourse” (Lorca 2014: 5) in defense 
against overbearing powers. However, it is equally clear that those same legal principles are 
vulnerable to cynical abuses to avoid scrutiny of repressive domestic practices. While small and 
vulnerable states may sincerely value democracy and human rights, they hesitate to shed the 
shield of sovereignty given past and present overreach dressed in humanitarian rhetoric.  
Given the international context of power disparities and the presence of domestic liberal 
traditions dating to independence, the tension between seemingly conflicting goods has a 
prominent history in the international relations of the Americas (Sikkink 1996; Cooper and 
Legler 2006). In that context, this article explores a Uruguayan proposal known as the Larreta 
Doctrine. In late 1945, Uruguayan Foreign Minister Eduardo Rodríguez Larreta1 proposed an 
                                                 
1 Following Spanish-language custom, his last name combines the patronymic Rodríguez and the matronymic 
Larreta, but his proposal came to be known as the Larreta Doctrine.   
inter-American responsibility for the advancement of human rights and democracy, which 
Rodríguez Larreta saw as ultimately inseparable. Actions to safeguard democracies and human 
rights would be permitted in advance by a government drawing its legitimacy from the people, 
and therefore would not violate national sovereignty. His conceptualization rested on an idea of 
popular sovereignty and the notion that states are charged with “internal and external duties.” He 
therefore called on American states to endorse “multilateral collective action” to sustain 
democracy and the “rights of man and of the citizen.” Internationally, the proposal emerged from 
a perception of “parallelism” between domestic democratic practice and respect for rights, on the 
one hand, and inter-American regional peace, on the other. Non-democracies and violators of 
human rights were presumed to be a threat to their neighbors. 
Under the Larreta Doctrine, all American states would have made a tripartite 
commitment. The first layer created a web of national commitments that treated democratic 
governance and the domestic protection of human rights as ultimately inseparable. The second 
established an insurance policy against failures to maintain those commitments. The third aspect 
— central for Rodríguez Larreta but overlooked by U.S. diplomats when they smiled upon the 
proposal — was a great power precommitment to work through the regional system instead of 
unilaterally. Crucially, the proposal required the approval of a supermajority of a regional 
organization before protective action could be undertaken. The Uruguayan recognized that the 
burden of enforcing any collective commitment would rely disproportionately on the historically 
interventionist United States, making its incorporation and its restraint equally crucial. The 
Larreta Doctrine advocated the early application of non-military means, avoiding some of the 
problems of coercive democracy promotion. In this sense, it foreshadowed and can enrich calls 
to increase attention to preventive means of protecting human rights and consolidating 
democracy without military intervention (Glanville 2017; Poast and Urpelainen 2015). 
 Scholarly proposals to recast sovereign commitments through precommitment regimes 
for the defense of democracy and human rights have emerged as one potential avenue to 
overcome the tension between sovereignty and international commitments (Buchanan and 
Keohane, 2011; Ikenberry and Slaughter, 2006). In a similar light, we argue that the Larreta 
Doctrine can be understood as an early proposal for a precommitment regime to defend 
democracy and human rights. We build on Buchanan and Keohane’s (2011, 55) definition of 
democratic precommitment regimes as “a contract by which a democratic government would 
authorize intervention in its own territory in response to violence that the government was unable 
to control, either due to incapacity or to having been dislodged from power by force.” For our 
purposes, international precommitments to democracy and human rights are broader in two 
respects. First, a non-democratic government could forge such an international contract either 
against rights abuses (R2P would provide such an example) or as a positive commitment to 
democratize. Secondly, such a contract does not have to authorize exclusively military, territorial 
intervention, as conceived above (e.g., Glanville 2017). The Larreta Doctrine illustrates a further, 
overlooked aspect of precommitment. Precommitments are seen as granting prerogatives to large 
states to intervene in certain circumstances; the benefits for small states that might suffer 
intervention have been discussed in terms of defense of a democratic regime from domestic 
nondemocratic adversaries (Pevehouse 2002; Closa and Palestini 2018). While that was one 
concern for the author of the Larreta Doctrine, he also worried about undemocratic subversion or 
intervention from abroad. Precommitment was a tool to promote a more democratic, and 
therefore more secure, region, and to restrain interventionist powers, including the United States, 
which might abuse the rhetoric of democracy and rights to pursue unilateral ends. In short, 
precommitment can be a tool for small states to pursue security in an asymmetrical context. An 
international precommitment regime is a contract by which a state or group of states recognizes 
as legitimate future measures by other signatories for the advancement or preservation of 
democratic practice and/or the defense of human rights, under specified conditions and through 
specified mechanisms and processes. 
 The literature on international precommitments has stressed the international motivations 
of great powers on the one hand and the domestic, regime-level incentives of small states on the 
other. Although those facets are important, we underscore the international motivations of small 
and vulnerable states, particularly concerning possible interventions. This article combines IR 
theoretical work on international precommitments with the multidisciplinary literature on the 
Global South’s historical engagements with international law (Lorca, 2014; Scarfi, 2017). This 
latter body of work emphasizes the defensive attachment to norms of sovereignty and non-
intervention. Our case emerges from the post-World War II inter-American system, which seems 
unlikely terrain for two reasons. First, the Latin American attachment to non-intervention is well-
documented. Secondly, despite the work of Sikkink (1996, 2014), post-WWII regional order 
building in the Americas is largely understood as the culmination of the U.S. hegemonic project. 
The inter-American system later became an important zone for the creation of human rights 
regimes (Lutz and Sikkink 2000; Sikkink 2014) and regional commitments to democracy 
(Cooper and Legler 2006). Our exploration of the Larreta Doctrine illuminates the efforts of a 
small Latin American state to reshape norms and practices around democracy, rights, and 
intervention, debates which shaped the foundations of today’s inter-American system. 
This episode has received limited historical study, perhaps because the Larreta proposal  
ultimately failed to overcome Latin American scepticism about diluting the recent, hard-won 
U.S. commitment to non-intervention—especially given many contemporary governments’ 
dubious democratic credentials. Failed diplomatic effects rarely receive substantial attention, but 
as Hathaway and Shapiro (2017) have recently argued regarding the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and 
several authors have noted regarding the Bandung Conference, failed initiatives can reshape 
norms and affect later institutional trajectories. While the Larreta Doctrine was not as far-
reaching as those hopeful failures,2 it left footprints regarding the reconceptualization of 
(non)intervention that shaped inter-American institutions during the post-WWII critical juncture. 
The Larreta Doctrine achieved substantial support and created institutional space and a textual 
legacy for later institutional deepening of protections for human rights and democracy in the 
Americas. A closer reading of the period, including the Larreta Doctrine, shows crucial Latin 
American contributions in issues of security, democracy, rights, and international organization 
often overlooked in U.S.-centric studies of the period.  
While the Inter-American Democratic Charter and other similar, more recent forms of 
international precommitment have been fairly successful in addressing classic military coups, 
they have been weak when confronting incumbent leaders over rights abuses and democratic 
decline (Feldmann et. al., 2019; Heine and Weiffen 2015). The Larreta Doctrine suggests a 
different set of tools for addressing the tension between non-intervention and international 
precommitments in those problematic cases—indeed, the type of situations that spurred the 
Uruguayan proposal. The Larreta Doctrine’s failure offers empirical, conceptual, and practical 
material from outside the European context and which predates post-Cold War regional efforts to 
                                                 
2 We thank Shirin Rai for suggesting this phrase. 
enshrine democracy and human rights. That the proposal originated with a small state that feared 
intervention and gained the support of other small, Latin American states, suggests that the 
commitments and interests of both great and small powers require equal attention if 
precommitment regimes are to be made viable and perceived as legitimate. 
The article proceeds as follows. First, we situate our discussion of the Larreta Doctrine in 
the literature on the sovereignty and the legitimacy of international human rights and democracy 
protection, particularly regarding proposals for international precommitments as a solution to this 
dilemma. Then, we turn to the inter-American and Latin American contexts, in which the Larreta 
Doctrine is best understood and on which it exercised, we will argue, lasting effects. In the 
empirical core of the article, we examine how the proposal of the Larreta Doctrine unfolded, 
drawing on original archival research in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, the United States, and 
Uruguay. We explore the responses of key states, the proposal’s failure, and its legacy. We 
conclude by assessing the implications for today’s still-thorny debates about how 
precommitments relate to sovereignty, popular will, and the collective promotion of individual 
wellbeing.  
Sovereignty, intervention, and precommitment  
As Krasner (1999) noted, norms of sovereignty have always been enunciated in juxtaposition 
with claims for the legitimacy of certain types of intervention. The concept of state sovereignty 
that IR traditionally ascribed to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia was refined over time by legal 
philosophers such as Vattel and Wolff, who articulated the corollary principle of non-
intervention. If the eighteenth century saw efforts to enshrine non-intervention into international 
law, the nineteenth century featured philosophical and legal challenges to it. Formulas for 
intervention against the sovereign consent of the target state often have problematic roots in 
Eurocentric assertions of moral superiority and a civilizing mission. Whyte (2016: 314) argues 
that under the conventional Westphalian narrative, “Non-intervention applied only to European 
states or those deemed civilized, while most of the world was open to European colonialism.” 
John Stuart Mill wrote that, “[T]he whole doctrine of noninterference with foreign nations should 
be reconsidered.” Non-intervention was appropriate “between one civilized nation and another,” 
Mill argued, but to suppose that “the same rules of international morality, can obtain…between 
civilized nations and barbarians, is a grave error” (Mill, 1867: 171-176; Jahn, 2005). In response, 
independent non-Western states sought to advance codification of international law, especially 
around sovereignty, to undermine the “standard of civilization” as the price of entry to the club 
of independent states, and thereby constrain common practices of gunboat diplomacy and 
intervention (Lorca 2014: 143-145).  
For obvious reasons, therefore, “Weaker states have always been the strongest supporters 
of the rule of nonintervention” (Krasner 1999: 21). Despite those clear benefits, small states also 
have recognized the corollary dangers of stringent norms of non-intervention, particularly for 
democracies. The notion of absolute sovereignty is challenged by the philosophical position that 
sovereignty resides not in the state but in the people. As expressed by Locke and Rousseau and 
advanced by the American and French revolutions, popular sovereignty questioned the right of 
an unjust monarch to claim the authority to rule. Many Latin American constitutions in the 
nineteenth century enshrined this right to rebellion in both letter and practice (Sabato, 2018: 89-
121). Controversy persists over whether locating sovereignty in the people implied only the right 
of those people to revolt against their own state or went further to the right of external states to 
intervene against those sovereigns who “render themselves the scourges and horror of the human 
race,” as Vattel wrote (Glanville 2014: 214-15). Some authors identify in this history the idea of 
conditional sovereignty, that the right to rule is dependent on the “responsible” exercise of 
authority (Evans, 2009: 34-37; Peters, 2009: 514; Bellamy, 2008: 19).  
Theory and practice of precommitment build on this foundation. While state 
commitments that limit sovereign discretion are not unusual, precommitments to democracy and 
human rights differ because the attenuations directly concern the prerogatives of ruling regimes 
vis-à-vis their own populations, not just foreign partners. Under democracy and human rights 
regimes or collectively adopted versions of R2P, states delegate adjudication and enforcement of 
aspects of domestic rule to international actors — regional organizations, the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC), or a loosely defined “international community.” As Simmons 
(2009:3) notes, states’ willingness to adopt such constraints “stands in contrast to a long-standing 
presumption of internal sovereignty.”  
Studies of R2P, human rights regimes, and democratic commitments are linked by a 
focus on how states’ sovereignty claims conflict with the international protection of individual 
wellbeing within states. Despite that connection, international commitments to protect human 
rights, on the one hand, and to uphold democratic governance, on the other, emerged on different 
tracks. The inception of the contemporary international human rights regime is usually credited 
to the post-World War II Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Sikkink 2018, ch. 3),3 as well 
as the institutionalization of the European human rights system (Moravcsik 2000). R2P emerged 
from the international human rights tradition and movement, though it is very much a product of 
the post-Cold War world. Across different iterations, R2P proposals all reconceptualize 
sovereignty to legitimate external intervention under certain circumstances.  
                                                 
3 C.f., Moyn (2010), who argues this regime emerged in the 1970s, and Kelly (2018) who makes this argument 
regarding Latin America. 
The formalization of international democratic commitments is thought to be even more 
recent. Though U.S. leaders since Woodrow Wilson invoked a universal right to democracy, 
attempts to create binding legal and normative frameworks for what Franck called “the emerging 
right of democratic governance” seemed to be a product of the post-Cold War world (Franck 
1992). Perhaps surprisingly, the literature on international democratic commitments places less 
emphasis on the implications for sovereignty, but similarly sees precommitments as a strategy to 
tie the hands of future, perhaps less democratic, leaders (Pevehouse 2002; Mansfield and 
Pevehouse 2006).  
Despite their different historical trajectories, international commitments to democracy 
and human rights have both led to proposals for precommitment regimes as a response to the 
dilemma of sovereignty and international protections. Buchanan and Keohane (2011) argue that 
sovereigns can create exceptions to their immunity through the adoption of “precommitment 
regimes.” If leaders voluntarily adopt commitments to protect human rights and maintain 
democratic governance, international enforcement would seem to support the sovereign will 
instead of subverting it. In Buchanan and Keohane’s proposal,  “fragile democracies” — states 
ruled by governments that currently enjoy popular sovereignty but may be at risk of future coups, 
ethnic conflicts bringing abuses of human rights, and the like — could “enter into a contract” 
authorizing future intervention in their territory by selected “guarantor states” in case of their 
own incapacity or forceful removal (2011, 41, 55). 
Given IR’s traditional emphasis on sovereign discretion, such invitations to intervention 
may appear unrealistic. However, various types of precommitment regimes operate in 
international relations today, including through global and regional commitments to human 
rights and regional accords on democracy in Africa, the Americas, and Europe. Buchanan and 
Keohane’s proposal finds support in Moravcsik’s (2000) work on the adoption of the European 
human rights regimes. Though many scholars have seen human rights commitments merely as 
“empty promises” (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005), agreements like the Rome Statute that 
created the International Criminal Court appear to create real transfers of sovereign discretion by 
states that could find their leaders under prosecution (Simmons and Danner 2010).  
International precommitment regimes have faced two classes of problems. First, though 
precommitment is offered as a solution to the problem of legitimacy, enforcement actions are 
still likely to be challenged. Precommitment’s relationship to sovereign discretion and immunity 
is not clear-cut, given problems of time-inconsistent preferences. Simply put: can the sovereign 
change its mind about precommitments, and what effect does that have on the legitimacy of 
actions to enforce commitments? Second, precommitment regimes face challenges of 
institutional design for decision-making and enforcement. These problems are intimately 
connected: without consensual mechanisms, actions under precommitment regimes are unlikely 
to be granted legitimacy by the relevant community of states, let alone the target of enforcement. 
With the existing international machinery often stymied by UNSC vetoes and regional 
objections, some scholars have proposed that legitimacy come instead from agreement among a 
league of democracies (Daalder and Lindsay 2007), with Kosovo often cited as an example. 
However, non-members and non-democracies are likely to oppose vehemently the legitimacy of 
such actions — as Russia opposed the Kosovo intervention. 
UNSC approval is a legal obstacle to the use of force, but it need not stop all actions 
related to precommitments. As Glanville (2017) argues, non-military preventive mechanisms 
may often provide greater benefits for human rights at lower costs. Similarly, the (uneven) 
enforcement of democratic and human rights clauses usually relies on reputational mechanisms 
as opposed to material or coercive sanction (Donno 2010). However, emphasizing means short 
of force is no guarantee that sovereignty will not be used as a shield. Non-military pressure is 
regularly denounced as an unwarranted intrusion into internal affairs, a position adopted by 
medium-sized states like Venezuela and Israel and major powers like China and Russia. States 
are jealous of their sovereignty in the face of international organization reports, court decisions, 
and economic sanctions. Agreed-upon mechanisms that ensure both restraint and consistency are 
crucial to ameliorating this opposition. 
Proposals by Buchanan and Keohane (2011) and Ikenberry and Slaughter (2006) focus on 
actions by great powers, especially the United States, and on violations in weak states. This risks 
missing the other side of the equation: constraints on intervention. A region must fulfil its 
commitments to support neighboring populations, while enforcing states must commit to acting 
only for the reasons and through the means established in the terms of the precommitment. 
Reciprocal precommitments from the region and the great power assuage some of the concerns 
of neocolonialism dressed in humanitarian garb (eg., Ayoob 2002). This combination, 
highlighted in the Larreta Doctrine, transforms intervention for human rights or democracy into a 
call for collective commitment that avoids numerous pitfalls inherent in forceful democracy 
promotion. Because the region gave sovereignty and non-intervention pride of place, Latin 
America’s debates around “collective intervention” offer a rich source of inspiration on 
balancing the desire to protect rights and (in some cases) democracy, with powerful interests, 
norms, and arguments in favor of strong sovereignty. We now turn to the evolution of these 
debates in the Americas. 
Inter-American divides on sovereignty, rights, and intervention 
Latin American diplomacy and international jurisprudence have long emphasized 
sovereignty and non-intervention. Many of the region’s best-known diplomatic names—Calvo, 
Drago, Estrada—are associated with doctrines that seek to reduce external intrusion in domestic 
affairs. Likewise, crucial Latin American diplomatic events, such as participation in the 1907 
Hague Conference and the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 
emphasize sovereignty and juridical equality, through which “Latin Americans transformed the 
structure of international law” (Lorca 2014: 304-305). As early as the 1860s, Argentine jurist 
Carlos Calvo began to campaign for an absolute prohibition on diplomatic or military 
intervention for debt collection, then a routine practice for North Atlantic powers. At a time 
when most European countries and the United States argued that their nationals deserved 
preferential treatment and effective extraterritorial sovereignty, Calvo countered that investors 
should not turn to their home governments for satisfaction but to the local courts (Calvo 1868). 
He was supported by the Argentine Foreign Minister Luis Maria Drago, who in response to the 
Venezuela crisis of 1903 called for an absolute prohibition on military intervention in “the 
territory of American nations” (Drago 1903). The United States, however, thwarted the adoption 
of the Calvo and Drago principles at a series of Pan-American conferences. Instead, Latin 
American governments incorporated Calvo’s principles into the language of contracts with 
foreign corporations, legal statutes, and national constitutions in the form of the so-called Calvo 
Clause, requiring parties to be bound by the host country’s judicial system. The Second Peace 
Conference at The Hague in 1907 adopted an attenuated version of the Drago Doctrine. 
Alongside the Argentine tradition, revolutionary Mexico also promoted strict non-intervention as 
a principle of international law. Venustiano Carranza, Mexico’s first constitutional president 
after the revolution of 1917, issued a doctrine holding that all nations are equal under the law, 
thus there could be no legitimate intervention—without exceptions. By 1930, Mexican Foreign 
Secretary Genaro Estrada extended the principle from non-intervention to non-interference by 
declaring that Mexico would no longer make judgments about the nature of foreign governments, 
whether they come to power legally or extralegally. The “Estrada Doctrine” was invoked by 
other countries following the model. These currents culminated in the hemisphere-wide adoption 
of strict non-intervention at the 1933 Montevideo Conference, which resolved that “no state has 
the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another”—a resolution signed by the 
United States.  
However, a parallel current recognized that sovereignty and absolute non-intervention, 
too, posed certain dangers. While central to the region’s diplomatic and international legal 
thinking, the claims above came with caveats—even from those who proposed them. Even 
Calvo, a lifelong champion of the principle of non-intervention, argued that English, French, and 
Russian intervention to put a stop to “the barbarities of the Turks” against Greek rebels was 
“fully justified in the light of the principles of international law” (Calvo, 1877: 303-304). Well 
before Rodríguez Larreta, Latin American diplomacy sought to use prior agreements to square 
sovereignty with intervention for rights protection, and to address the related problem of colonial 
practices that ignored the sovereignty of poor countries. Concerned about instability generated 
by frequent uprisings and coups at the turn of the 20th century, Carlos Tobar, the former foreign 
minister of Ecuador, argued that Latin American states should be prepared to collectively deny 
recognition to governments that come to power by violence against the constitutional order. The 
“Tobar Doctrine” was incorporated in the style of a precommitment regime, albeit without 
developed mechanisms for implementation, into a treaty among the Central American states in 
1907 and another among the Andean countries in 1911 (Fabela 1991). Though non-intervention 
remained the prominent Latin American discourse, as seen in Pan-American conferences 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s (Lorca 2014; Scarfi 2017), a budding generation of Latin 
American democrats during those same years looked towards international commitments to 
advance their struggle against authoritarianism. Victor Haya de la Torre, a Peruvian democrat 
with a continental following, argued in 1941 that “Violations of democratic rights demanded a 
common response” (qtd. in Schwartzberg, 2003). During a notable democratic interregnum, in 
August 1944, Cuba argued that, “An attenuation of the unrestricted concept of sovereignty would 
constitute, in the judgment of the Government of Cuba, a great step forward to advance this 
end.”4 This should be supported by a Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations and of the 
International Rights and Duties of the Individual in line with the Atlantic Charter.  
Though globally most attention has been to precommitments to halt violations of human 
rights, in the Americas, the notion of regional precommitments regarding democracy has long 
sparked significant debate. Hawkins and Shaw (2007) note that objections to the legalization of 
democratic commitments—long prevalent in mere declaratory form—were contextualized in 
terms of defense of sovereignty. The Americas seemed to move to a new equilibrium after the 
Cold War, with a collective democratic commitment made in OAS Resolution 1080 in 1991 and 
culminating in the 2001 signature of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. The IADC treated 
democracy as a right, while “new, more stringent democratic norms” gave the inter-American 
community a greater enforcement role (Heine and Weiffen, 2015: 61-62), effectively 
“sanctioning external intervention for principled reasons” (Feldmann et. al., 2019: 451). 
                                                 
4 Cuban Foreign Ministry, Puntos de vista del gobierno de Cuba sobre la organización internacional para la paz, 
August 14, 1944, Folder III-635-1(6a). Archives of the Mexican Foreign Ministry (hereafter, SRE-MEX), Mexico 
City. 
Although the application of democratic commitments has been uneven, and incumbents continue 
to claim a sovereign shield even as they backslide on earlier state commitments to democracy 
and human rights, the Latin American tradition of seeking to balance sovereignty and democracy 
protection continues into our own time. 
 The following section recounts the context, emergence, support for, and eventual defeat 
of the Larreta Doctrine. It focuses on how participants in this debate understood the relationship 
of precommitments to sovereignty; on issues of legitimacy and processes of decision-making; 
and on the balance between great powers and small, vulnerable states.  
The Larreta Doctrine 
On October 19, 1945, in the context of an apparent Argentine drift toward fascism, Uruguayan 
Foreign Minister Eduardo Rodríguez Larreta handed U.S. Ambassador William Dawson a note 
that challenged the core assumption of 20th-century Latin American diplomacy. The sacrosanct 
principle of non-intervention, Rodríguez Larreta wrote, should not be used to mask notorious and 
repeated violations of elementary human and civil rights, which were a matter of legitimate 
interest for other states. Instead, “parallelism between democracy and peace” should henceforth 
be advanced as an inter-American norm. Any action, to be sure, “must be collective.” (qtd. in 
FRUS 1945, doc. 126). Secretary of State James Byrnes, who understood this as an anti-
Argentine measure, responded with enthusiasm, promising the United States would 
“immediately and vigorously support him in all of the American capitals” if Rodríguez Larreta 
were to circulate his proposal “as a basis for joint action” against Argentina (FRUS 1945, doc. 
127). Rodríguez Larreta replied that he planned to introduce the measure to the inter-American 
system, but without mention of Argentina to avoid provoking his larger neighbor and because he 
believed the issue was of broader significance (FRUS 1945, doc. 128).5  
One month later, Rodríguez Larreta sent all American states a longer note, which 
reshaped his initial message into a proposal for precommitment.6 He called for an endorsement 
of “multilateral collective action” to sustain democracy and “rights of man and of the citizen.” 
Past declarations were insufficient without collective commitments and procedures to support 
them. In short, “the necessity of a system of international protection of those rights is 
proclaimed.” Governments enjoying popular legitimacy would grant previous sanction for 
actions to protect endangered democracies and to forestall or halt egregious violations of human 
rights; as such, enforcement would not violate true sovereignty. Moreover, Rodríguez Larreta 
wrote to the State Department that his plan would require a supermajority vote in a regional 
system of juridically equal states to authorize any action, which would be permitted under the 
UN Charter’s Article 51, but not require separate UN approval (FRUS 1945, doc. 133). The 
formula sought to square the dilemma between highly valued sovereign equality and the 
principles of regional democracy and rights. 
Rodríguez Larreta’s proposal was in line with a Uruguayan diplomatic tradition of 
seeking to punch above its bantamweight by offering innovations to international law that would 
help protect small states. Abreu described Uruguay’s international policy as “increasing the 
country’s credibility and prestige in inverse proportion to its geographical, military, and 
economic presence” (qtd. in Casal Tatlock 1997, 7). At the Second Peace Conference at The 
                                                 
5 Discussed in William Dawson [U.S. Ambassador in Uruguay] to Secretary of State James Byrnes, 31 October 
1945, FRUS (1945), vol. IX, doc. 128. 
6 Rodríguez Larreta, November 21, 1945. Nota del gobierno del Uruguay. In Pan-American Union, Consulta del 
gobierno del Uruguay y contestaciones de los gobiernos sobre paralelismo entre la democracia y la paz (hereafter 
Consulta) May 1946, in Folder III-1156-2 (27bis), SRE-MEX. English translation in FRUS, 1945, vol. IX, doc. 131. 
Hague in 1907, Uruguay proposed a system of compulsory, supranational arbitration to replace 
interstate conflict. In 1920, noting the weakness of the League of Nations in the absence of the 
United States, Uruguayan President Baltasar Brum advanced a proposal for an American League 
of Nations that would replace the unilateralist Monroe Doctrine with an egalitarian organization 
for collective defense that would embed U.S. power in a multilateral system (Scarfi 2017, 82-
83). At the Pan-American Conference in Havana in 1928, Uruguay introduced a resolution 
calling upon member states to determine when exceptions to the non-intervention principle 
should be permitted; these should be adjudicated by an international tribunal. Rodríguez Larreta 
expressed the hope that Montevideo might play a role in Latin America comparable to Geneva in 
Europe.7 Tiny Uruguay, flanked by the South American powerhouses of Argentina and Brazil, 
used international diplomacy to try to escape a Thucydidean fate. In addition, liberal Uruguay 
evoked the Kantian tradition that republics are less warlike than nonrepresentative regimes. 
Rodríguez Larreta’s predecessor, José Serrato, told the San Francisco Conference in 1945 that 
“Uruguay, as a small country without military power, knows that the destiny of its liberty and the 
full exercise of its sovereignty…rest on the universal imperium of democratic norms” (qdt. in 
Casal Tatlock 1997, 218). The notion that democracies would not go to war with one another, 
and that war was a threat to democratic survival, especially for small states, came together in 
Rodríguez Larreta’s call for a system of collective defense of democratic and human rights. This 
system would protect Uruguayan security by binding the United States and Argentina to 
multilateralism while advancing the creation of a peaceful, democratic neighborhood. 
                                                 
7 Dawson to Byrnes, No. 6568, 7 November 1945, 835.00/11-745, RG 59, U.S. National Archives, College Park, 
MD (hereafter NARA). 
Though Rodríguez Larreta’s diplomatic notes called for “multilateral action” and not 
“intervention,” the foreign minister juxtaposed his proposal to absolutist principles of non-
intervention, calling for a “harmonization” of conflicting principles that presumably required a 
reconceptualization of sovereignty. Regardless, Latin American sceptics saw the Larreta 
Doctrine as formalizing a road to military intervention. A week after issuing his diplomatic 
circular, Rodríguez Larreta clarified publicly that the proposal was not about military means. 
There was “an infinite range of gradations starting with softer measures…according to the scale 
that circumstances dictate” (qtd. in Casal Tetlock 1997, 57). He echoed today’s frustrations, 
though, saying that American states could not cite non-intervention and then stand by “with arms 
crossed” while others violated “essential and sacred” principles.  
When American republics issued replies in December 1945 and January 1946, many 
expressed hesitation about weakening non-intervention. In a February 2, 1946 message, 
Rodríguez Larreta responded to “the resistance that has been raised, emanating from the fear that 
the principle of non-intervention would be modified.” His revised proposal sketched the 
mechanism for enforcement: any denunciation of a country for violating human or democratic 
rights must be made by a minimum of three countries; at least two-thirds of countries represented 
at a meeting of the Pan-American Union must vote in favor of any measures; these measures 
must be peaceful, with a maximum sanction of breaking of diplomatic relations as “one of the 
recommended measures of exercising collective action, and surely, one of the most efficient.” If 
that proved insufficient, the issue would go before the UNSC or the General Assembly.8 In its 
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essence, his proposal emphasized regional collective action, the illegitimacy of unilateral 
intervention, and precommitment to protect popular sovereignty. 
Following a pattern common to scholarship on U.S.-Latin American relations, earlier 
accounts have suggested that despite its name, the Larreta Doctrine was just one more U.S. 
project. One author asserts that “Spruille Braden, who had left Buenos Aires to become assistant 
secretary of state for American republic affairs, induced the Uruguayan foreign minister, 
Eduardo Rodríguez Larreta, to issue an appeal for collective intervention to ensure democracy 
and respect for human rights in the Americas” (Langley 2010, 164, emphasis added). Another 
suggests it might as well have been called the Braden-Larreta Proposal, “since it appeared to 
have been stimulated by the new Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs” 
(Kesler 1985, 261). At the time, the opposition Uruguayan newspaper El Debate questioned why 
Rodríguez Larreta wanted to turn Uruguay into the tip of the spear for U.S. intervention in 
Argentina (El Debate 1945).9 The Argentine government was also suspicious. Foreign Minister 
Juan Isaac Cooke described the “transcendental” achievement of consensus on non-intervention 
as the product of a century of effort that Rodríguez Larreta now threatened to undo. Given the 
disproportionate power of the United States, Cooke concluded, if the proposal were to be 
implemented, “the control of the intervention policy would fall upon the United States.”10 The 
point has clear corollaries in today’s concerns about great power exceptionalism and the 
justification of power politics in the name of democracy and human rights. 
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Although Braden did welcome Rodríguez Larreta’s proposal, the State Department did 
not initiate it (FRUS 1945, docs. 129, 130),11 and it diverged significantly from the traditional 
U.S. approach to the region. By embedding any potential pressure or sanction in a multilateral 
process requiring a supermajority of the region’s states, the Larreta Doctrine would have 
hamstrung U.S. unilateralism by strengthening institutional binding mechanisms. The Uruguayan 
tried to allay concerns that his proposal would undo the hard-won intervention prohibition 
extracted from the United States after decades of Latin American efforts (Friedman and Long 
2015), culminating in U.S.-signed resolutions at inter-American conferences at Montevideo in 
1933 and Buenos Aires in 1936 that asserted that “No state has the right to intervene in the 
internal or external affairs of another.” Rodríguez Larreta argued that his proposal would never 
alter this norm, because it disallowed any single state from intervening unilaterally. To the extent 
that his insistence on using only peaceful instruments of intervention was genuine, Rodríguez 
Larreta also intended to eliminate armed intervention as practiced by Washington, a source Latin 
America’s obsession with absolute sovereignty. Taken together, the ban on military intervention 
combined with the establishment of a multilateral requirement for collective actions would have 
created a counterweight to the exercise of U.S. hegemony.  
Reactions to Larreta  
Within two months, all American states had replied formally to the proposal, except Argentina 
which denounced it publicly. Their replies ranged from strong support to vehement opposition 
based in norms of non-intervention. Uruguay tried to square its proposal with that concern in 
several ways. Montevideo’s El País (1946, January 6), Rodríguez Larreta’s press outlet, argued 
that in light of the Good Neighbor Policy, “Now, no one thinks about unilateral interventions. 
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That which was once a threat has completely dissipated. The principle of non-intervention 
belongs to public inter-American law and is incorporated into the conscience of the government 
and people of the United States.”12 While the proclamations of the Good Neighbor era might 
have satisfied Uruguayan concerns, U.S. power still looked quite different to states in its 
immediate vicinity. As a Mexican critic charged, the proposal represented nothing less than a 
doctrinal shift from non-intervention to “neo-intervention” (Paniagua 1945). Despite that, the 
Larreta Doctrine garnered support from several fragile democracies near the United States, 
indicating that under the right circumstances, even vulnerable countries may be willing to 
precommit. We briefly examine the responses of key supportive countries: the United States as 
the crucial great power and Guatemala as a supportive emerging democracy. Colombia 
represents an opposing democracy (a position shared by Chile). Mexico and Brazil played crucial 
roles as the largest Latin American states, both ultimately in opposition. Unlike one-party 
Mexico, with its history of U.S. intervention, Brazil’s opposition, in the midst of its own 
democratic transition, is surprising in light of arguments that transitional leaders will seek to 
lock-in their successors. 
United States 
The strongest power in the hemisphere immediately embraced the idea, initially in the hope of 
using it “as a basis for joint action in relation to the Farrell Government” in Argentina.13 The 
Truman administration believed the government of Edelmiro Julián Farrell and Juan Domingo 
Perón represented a node of Axis ideology that threatened postwar Allied interests in Latin 
America. Rodríguez Larreta hurriedly informed the State Department that there should be no 
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mention of Argentina in a discussion of principles.14 The two countries coordinated their 
diplomatic and press campaigns on behalf of the proposal, with Secretary of State James Byrnes 
careful to instruct U.S. diplomats not to give the false impression that it was a U.S. initiative.15 
Once the debate was underway, Byrnes stated “my Government’s unqualified adherence to the 
principles enunciated” by Rodríguez Larreta.16 U.S. officials were heartened to see some smaller 
states such as Costa Rica, Panama, and Guatemala respond positively, “notwithstanding the fact 
that those states might have been expected to be the most interested in maintaining the view that 
a country’s internal affairs are not susceptible of consideration by other countries, much less of 
collective action by other countries.”17 The Doctrine seemed to present a timely opportunity to 
rally regional opposition to Buenos Aires, even as the United States was taking unilateral (and 
ultimately counterproductive) steps against Argentina at odds with the Larreta Doctrine’s 
multilateral foundation.  
Guatemala 
The proposal evinced warm support from a country that shared Uruguay’s position as a relatively 
precarious democracy, but had greater concerns about U.S. intervention. Guatemala had emerged 
from generations of dictatorship the year before, and its president Juan José Arévalo faced 
hostility from nearby authoritarian rulers such as Tiburcio Carías Andino of Honduras and 
Anastasio Somoza García of Nicaragua. Arévalo suffered multiple coup attempts by his own 
military. At the February 1945 Chapultepec Conference, Guatemala proposed that the American 
republics agree not to recognize governments that came to power through coups against 
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democratic regimes. Guatemalan Foreign Minister Guillermo Toriello praised the Uruguayan 
proposal as “entirely in agreement with the modern principle of international interdependence 
which replaces the archaic concept of absolute sovereignty of states; being the only manner 
possible to protect internationally the rights of man and to achieve a truly democratic world.”18 
Guatemala exemplifies a weak state that saw potential protection in Rodríguez Larreta’s proposal 
against anti-democratic domestic and neigboring foes. Several other fragile democracies, 
including Cuba and Venezuela, enunciated similar supportive rationales despite precedents of 
U.S. and other great power intervention. Small states whose sovereignty had been repeatedly 
violated saw the benefits of a system of constraints on unilateral great power action tied to a 
regional mechanism to strengthen democracies against the possibility of military coups and 
interference from authoritarian neighbors.  
Colombia 
The Colombian response to Rodríguez Larreta, on the other hand, foreshadowed many concerns 
about R2P expressed by the Global South. Different forms of government should be respected, 
and under different regimes “it is very difficult, if not impossible, to guarantee the essential 
rights of man.” It is better, then, that any policy should safeguard “small and defenseless 
nations.” Colombia even opposed the sorts of “investigative commissions” that might be 
necessary to ascertain conditions on the ground, as these “would put an end completely to the 
concept of sovereignty.”19 With an apparently stable system of alternating two-party rule, 
Colombia’s political culture in 1945-46 was less sensitive to acute fears of possible coups d’état, 
even as its history of civil violence may have invited unwanted international scrutiny. Having 
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lost its most prized asset when the U.S. intervened to help its Panamanian province secede, 
Colombia was not willing to see absolute strictures against intervention watered down in any 
way. Colombia coordinated its opposition with Chile, which likewise had a long tradition of 
oligarchic civilian rule, democratic in form.20  
Mexico 
Perhaps no state resisted Rodríguez Larreta as forcefully as Mexico; its opposition was probably 
the death knell for the proposal. Unlike Brazil, which hesitated to make a formal response, 
Mexico answered Uruguayan proposals quickly and vigorously. The official rejection was 
communicated on December 10, 1945, arguing that “the principle of non-intervention…should 
not be weakened in any form.” Doing so would risk unleashing “even greater evils” than those 
that Rodríguez Larreta hoped to contain.21 Mexican opposition created useful cover for smaller 
states in the hemisphere—especially those with even weaker democratic credentials than 
Mexico—to oppose the United States.22 The Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua—each with living memories of interventions, occupations, and kingmaking by U.S. 
Marines — quickly rejected the proposal; Panama expressed strong reservations. El Salvador 
denounced it as “a dangerous precedent.”23 However, as a government still clinging to its 
revolutionary credentials, and one which had enshrined the panoply of rights in its constitution, 
Mexico’s opposition required a delicate balance. The Mexican Foreign Ministry published a 44-
page memorandum in February 1946 deconstructing the Uruguayan proposal. Mexico’s 
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declarative support for democracy at home and human rights in international forums, did not 
extend to altering non-intervention. While agreeing that international law posed ever-larger 
constraints on domestic politics, Mexico argued that “actually, it would be prejudicial and 
against the most recent international instruments to propose a violation of said internal 
jurisdiction, even by means of collective action.”24  
Rodríguez Larreta sought space for cooperation with Mexico, noting a seeming openness 
to responding to rights violations with collective ruptures in diplomatic relations. Even there, 
Mexico indicated that the matter should be dealt with by the United Nations.25 Mexican Foreign 
Secretary Francisco Castillo Nájera clarified the country’s opposition in a letter to Brazil, listing 
“the motives for which Mexico adopts its non-interventionist doctrine, which above all respects 
the sovereignty of states” as the reason for rejecting the Larreta Doctrine.  
Brazil 
Brazil, which was engaged in its own electoral transition from the long authoritarian rule of 
Getúlio Vargas, was slow to make a formal reply. However, its diplomats were sceptical from 
the beginning. The proposal was “impeccable and even magnificent in form” but “it is still very 
dangerous in essence given its concern with the sovereignty of weak states, which if it were 
approved, would be at grave risk regarding their sovereignty and liberty.”26 Brazil’s ongoing 
transition and entrenched doctrinal emphases on both sovereignty and friendliness with the 
United States created a dilemma. It could embrace the Larreta Doctrine, given U.S. support, but 
that could cause trouble with the still influential Vargas. Conversely, it could reject the doctrine 
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and risk raising questions about its commitment to democratic transition. Itamaraty (the palace 
housing the foreign ministry) communicated quietly with U.S. Ambassador Adolf A. Berle, a 
major proponent, that the proposal “would not be advisable at this moment” but that it was open 
to greater consultations (FRUS 1945, doc. 146).  
Precommitment and intervention 
For all his protestations that he never intended to weaken the stricture against military 
intervention, Rodríguez Larreta still made a point of arguing that the Latin American norm of 
absolute sovereignty had gone too far. In a press conference, he criticized “this concept of a 
sovereignty with an almost divine essence, hermetic, intangible, and untouchable” which had 
been paired with a principle of non-intervention that had become “an impenetrable veil behind 
which countries may commit any kind of attack.…” (qtd. in Casal Tatlock 1997, 57). His 
proposal intended to “defend the principle of non-intervention and to repudiate all interventions 
that are isolated [i.e. unilateral] and presumably self-interested; but to create an international 
tribunal that can prevent the abuses and scandals that can take place behind the shield of this 
principle of non-intervention” (qtd. in Casal Tatlock 1997, 213). 
After Rodríguez Larreta left office, Uruguayan Foreign Minister Mateo Marques Castro 
(1947, 12) explained that the Larreta Doctrine “does not imply—ever—the intervention of one 
State or group of States in the affairs of another.” Protecting human rights “requires, for its 
application, the previous existence of a norm freely agreed to on the basis of a juridical order 
accepted by the Parties.” The Uruguayans were building upon the notion of precommitment 
established in South American traditions of international law. In his 1944 legal treatise, Daniel 
Antokoletz of Argentina defined intervention as illegitimate unless it was permitted by pre-
established treaty. This applied, for example, to the defensive preservation of the state 
(conservación in Spanish legal writing). Chile’s Alejandro Álvarez’s text on principles of 
“modern international law,” approved by the Academia Diplomática Internacional, the Unión 
Jurídica Internacional, and the International Law Association, included Article 22: “In the 
absence of a special juridical title, no State has the right to intervene, especially by force, in the 
internal or external affairs of another State, without the consent of the latter, even when the 
persons or possessions of its nationals are endangered. Collective intervention by all States or a 
group of them is permitted according to the dispositions of the charters of global, continental, or 
regional organizations” (Álvarez 1944, 37-40). During a visit to Montevideo, Brazilian jurist 
Levi Carneiro argued that the Larreta Doctrine “was not a precipitous and imprudent innovation: 
on the contrary, it was the crystallization of a doctrinarian movement that has been fortified and 
intensified, characterizing the new phase of international law.” He cast the Uruguayan proposal 
as an international version of the revolutionary Declaration of the Rights of Man. “Certain 
fundamental rights, certain ‘human rights’ as has already been said, need a collective 
international guarantee, just as has happened with ‘social rights’ relative to working conditions 
(qtd. in El País 1946, October 23).27 Isidro Fabela, a longtime adviser on international law to the 
Mexican Foreign Ministry, took note of these arguments while cautioning against the danger of 
an interventionist power (read: the United States) taking advantage of multilateral mechanisms to 
pressure smaller powers to go along. However, even Fabela, a staunch defender of non-
intervention, made his strongest case against humanitarian intervention when decided 
“unilaterally by the same power that executes it, because this power then becomes both judge 
and jury” (Fabela 1991, 150). If the Larreta Doctrine had not convinced, it would still seem to 
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leave open the possibility of collective action if a precommitment mechanism could be 
developed to address the core concerns of the critics. 
The defeat and the denouement 
As early as December 14, 1945, U.S. diplomat John Moors Cabot privately concluded that “the 
Rodríguez Larreta note has already boomeranged badly throughout the Hemisphere.”28 By the 
middle of 1946, the proposal had faded from view. In the summary of the debate published by 
the Pan-American Union in 1946, thirteen states opposed the Larreta Doctrine while eight 
supported it. It was left off the agenda for the Rio Conference in 1947. This quick defeat, despite 
the support of the United States, consigned the Larreta Doctrine to the status of historical 
curiosity. Was its influence so fleeting? The debate on rights and how to secure them continued 
over the next several years as the inter-American system took shape. Rights advocates in that 
debate deployed similar language, and the Larreta Doctrine’s supporters pushed for greater 
collective responsibilities in the Americas for the protection of human rights and democracy. 
This led to the inclusion of seemingly contradictory impulses in the founding documents of the 
post-war inter-American system (Sikkink 1996); some of these were taken up again by 
international democracy and human rights advocates decades later. Rodríguez Larreta’s proposal 
did not cause these later changes, but his influence in the post-war moment left a legacy in the 
inter-American system. 
Rodríguez Larreta first proposed his doctrine during the preparations for an inter-
American conference on reciprocal defense. When the conference finally met in Rio de Janeiro 
in September 1947, the American states agreed on a collective defense pact. While this pact is 
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often treated as an early indicator of Cold War tensions in the Americas, it was also an extension 
of wartime cooperation that emerged more directly from the 1945 Inter-American Conference on 
the Problems of War and Peace (the Chapultepec Conference) than from U.S.-Soviet rivalry. 
While much of the debate in the postwar conferences surrounded economic issues, some 
delegations continued to press for greater attention to human rights and democracy, including 
advocacy for a system that went beyond declarations of principles. In 1946, the Governing Board 
of the PAU approved a draft Declaration of the Rights and Duties of American States, which 
included, “It is the duty and obligation of each American State to respect and promote the rights 
and liberties consecrated in the Declaration of International Rights and Duties of Man, without 
distinction of race, sex, language, or religion.”29 The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance (1947) bears the imprint of the Larreta Doctrine and contemporaneous debates — 
though in the preamble and not in the binding clauses. The treaty says: 
peace is founded on justice and moral order and, consequently, on the international 
recognition and protection of human rights and freedoms, on the indispensable well-being 
of the people, and on the effectiveness of democracy for the international realization of 
justice and security.  
The next year, at the Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogotá, the 
delegations created the Organization of American States to provide a more robust mechanism for 
regional consultation and decisionmaking and signed a separate treaty on peaceful settlement of 
disputes. The conference approved a positive vision of rights in the American Declaration on the 
Rights and Duties of Man (ADRDM), as well as an anti-communist resolution on The 
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Preservation and Defense of Democracy in the Americas. The ADRDM is best known for its 
enunciation of civil, social, and economic rights, and as a precursor well known to the authors of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It places the onus for the protection of these rights at 
the national level “as best suited” to contemporary conditions. Following the Mexican dismissal 
of the Larreta Doctrine that left open the possibility of future action, the declaration adds that the 
American states “should increasingly strengthen that system in the international field as 
conditions become more favorable.” Though the OAS Charter includes several references to 
promoting representative democracy and an article that “the State shall respect the rights of the 
individual and the principles of universal morality,” it prioritized sovereignty, non-intervention, 
juridical equality, and territorial inviolability. Clearly, in the late 1940s, the moment was not ripe 
for precommitment as envisioned in the Larreta Doctrine. 
This would seem to be the final repudiation of Rodríguez Larreta. Indeed, the OAS 
Charter’s Article 19 closed the Larreta loophole by updating the resolutions from the 1930s 
asserting that “no state” may practice intervention—which Rodríguez Larreta argued left open 
the possibility of collective intervention—to read “no state or group of states.” However, some of 
Rodríguez Larreta’s proposal lived on in the Charter. In the original, 1948 version, the charter 
included Larreta-like language: “The solidarity of the American States and the high aims which 
are sought through it require the political organization of those States on the basis of the effective 
exercise of representative democracy.” Later, it reads, “the State shall respect the rights of the 
individual and the principles of universal morality.” However, this language was contradicted by 
a focus on inviolable sovereignty elsewhere in the charter, and more importantly by decades of 
comity with authoritarian practices. The influence of the Larreta Doctrine was more evident in 
the ADRDM and concurrent, though stillborn, proposals for inter-American human rights organs 
(Cabranes 1967: 1161-62).  
By 1950, the democratic tide in the Americas had begun to recede, a trend the United 
States advanced in 1954 when the CIA helped orchestrate a coup against the elected successor to 
the Guatemalan president who had forcefully supported the Larreta Doctrine. The American 
Declaration and contemporary texts, closely tied to the Larreta Doctrine and its proponents, 
again gained relevance in the Americas starting in 1959 as rights violations and foreign meddling 
by Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo came to light. In the Declaration of Santiago that year, the 
foreign ministers of the Americas echoed Rodríguez Larreta’s argument about the parallelism 
between democracy and rights domestically and inter-American peace (Cabranes 1967: 1164), 
while carefully emphasizing principles of non-intervention (OAS 1959, 1960). While not 
binding, that declaration emphasized that “anti-democratic regimes” violated the OAS Charter 
and caused “widespread disturbance” in the region. The actions of 1959-1960 added another 
layer to the postwar foundations with the creation of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (Engstrom 2016; Goldman 2009), which was created with direct reference to the 
ADRDM. Indeed, the IACHR claimed, somewhat controversially, that the 1948 declaration and 
the reference to “human rights” in the OAS Charter gained legally binding status; these texts 
both emerged from the immediate context of the Larreta Doctrine debate. Charles Fenwick 
(1963), supportive of Larreta in 1946, later reflected on these events to suggest “inter-American 
collective action” on nonrecognition of despotic governments. 
Regional efforts on human rights were largely dormant until 1978—and increasingly 
separate from democracy protection—when the long-awaited American Convention on Human 
Rights went into force during a notorious period of human rights violations under military 
governments (Engstrom 2016). Despite several other proposals from Latin Americans, regional 
commitments to democracy waited until the end of the Cold War, when all American states 
except for Cuba signed the Santiago declaration in 1991. A decade later, this was superseded by 
the Inter-American Democratic Charter. Effective since 1997, Article 9 of the revised OAS 
Charter echoes the Larreta Doctrine: it provides for the suspension of states whose democratic 
governments have been toppled by force, after consultations and non-coercive attempts at 
restoration, by a two-thirds vote of the OAS General Assembly (Cooper and Legler 2001). The 
Charter’s chapter on “Strengthening and Preservation of Democratic Institutions” also echoes 
Rodríguez Larreta’s language. The text studiously avoids the term “intervention,” but includes 
provisions for states to appeal to the OAS if their democratic systems are at risk, and, more 
controversially, that the OAS may take actions “for the preservation of the democratic system 
and its strengthening” (OAS 2001, chap. IV). These were imperfect and incomplete steps toward 
giving weight to the democratic promises made in the founding documents of the inter-American 
system (Heine and Weiffen 2015), though the ambiguity and weakness of their mechanisms for 
collective response have been laid bare by the erosion of democracy and human rights in 
Venezuela and elsewhere. 
Conclusions 
The tension between non-intervention and international protections has been particularly 
prominent in inter-American relations. Today, it animates regional debates over the response to 
crises in Venezuela and Nicaragua, as well as over the role of international anti-corruption 
commissions in Guatemala and Honduras. The debate is seen often along simplified lines: the 
United States, operating from a position of uncontested power, favors easing restrictions on 
interventions in defense of human rights and democracy—or more critically, interventions to 
pursue its interests under the guise of human rights and democracy. Conversely, Latin Americans 
are tireless champions of sovereignty and non-intervention as the last recourse of relatively weak 
states. This pattern has largely characterized—and to some degree, limited—U.S.-led order 
building in the Americas at least since the Second World War, according to many narratives. The 
major exception to this was the immediate post-Cold War era, in which liberal commitments 
expanded across the hemisphere for several years before entering into a prolonged and deepening 
retrenchment. The history of the Larreta Doctrine adds significant nuance to this understanding. 
Despite its ultimate failure, the proposal was an innovative attempt to use international 
precommitment as a bridge between traditional Latin American insistence on non-intervention 
and goals of advancing democracy and protecting human rights.  
Drawing on the Larreta Doctrine and debate, we speak to more recent proposals for 
precommitment regimes in democracy and human rights. Legitimacy for precommitment 
regimes requires greater attention to the interests of small and vulnerable states, especially the 
importance of reciprocal commitments among neighbors and constraints on great powers, if the 
regimes are to be accepted and perceived as broadly legitimate. The major objections to the 
Larreta Doctrine prefigured the lines of opposition to international action in response to rights 
and democratic violations a half century later, among both scholars and practitioners. These 
included the protection of sovereignty, a defense of pluralism in international society, scepticism 
about the universality of rights, legitimizing the vulnerabilities of small states, and the related 
practical implication that the responsibility—and therefore decision—for intervention would fall 
to the greatest powers. Rodríguez Larreta’s version of precommitment offers a tripartite 
commitment that is more attuned to the concerns of the less powerful. 
Small and vulnerable states might agree more readily to the sort of precommitment 
regime that Buchanan and Keohane (2011) proposed, if it were supplemented in the ways the 
Larreta Doctrine suggests. In a critique of Buchanan and Keohane, Hehir (2011) implied that 
only states that are unlikely to experience breakdown would commit. Most interesting in that 
sense are the stances adopted by Uruguay, Guatemala, and Cuba. These small states came close 
to the precommitment ideal, yet they supported the doctrine despite the very real possibility of 
great power intervention. Their precarious democracies faced threats from within (coups and 
quasi-fascist opponents) and from without, including threats and interference from authoritarian 
neighbors. The protection of democracy—and therefore the defense of popular sovereignty—in 
small and vulnerable states would be advanced by this regional precommitment. This logic 
suggests the utility of a voluntary precommitment regime, even when this is not universal in 
character, with a clear process of decisionmaking. That Uruguay crafted the proposal with one 
eye on a threatening Argentine government suggests that small states might see precommitment 
regimes as a source of regional as well as domestic stability. Guatemalan support of the Larreta 
doctrine provides another telling counterexample of a state that faced immediate internal and 
regional challenges to democracy—and would later suffer unilateral U.S. intervention with 
ruinous consequences. Rómulo Betancourt, twice the leader of Venezuela’s fragile democracy, 
consistently advocated regional democratic precommitment mechanisms. These countries’ 
positions were shaped by external threats from neighbors, domestic coup threats, and the 
looming great power. Larreta-style precommitment helped balance those pressures. 
The logic of Larreta precommitment foreshadows that of African and Latin American 
states decades later when they committed to the International Criminal Court despite the 
foreseeability of indictments against their citizens and even leaders or to commitments to 
democratically dense regional organizations (Pevehouse 2002). Serbin and Serbin Pont (2015) 
observe that “the apparent dichotomy between ‘champions’ and ‘sceptics’ is often blurred,” 
notably in Argentina’s recent record of opposing U.S. intervention while promoting R2P 
principles in the regional system (see also, Feldmann et al., 2019). The African Union 
Constitutive Act went even further in endorsing collective intervention by the regional 
organization, though for a narrower set of gross violations of human rights. Its Article 4(h) 
includes “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the 
Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity,” though this has never been invoked (Mboya 2009; Makinda and Okumu 2007).  
Questions of discretion and process continue to bedevil these rights and democracy 
protection regimes, especially because they raise doubts about procedural legitimacy and 
highlight practical difficulties with responding to any given crisis. The Larreta Doctrine offered 
several innovations regarding process. First, it shifted decisions and actions to a regional 
context—a move later echoed in diplomatic practice. This fit with contemporary Latin American 
efforts to buttress the inter-American system within the new global institutional order. Indeed, 
Serbin and Rodrigues (2011) argue that the Latin American example shows regional 
organizations can play a special role in the implementation of rights protections, given their 
mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of inter-state conflicts. At the same time, the Larreta 
process would avoid the inaction caused by the superpower veto—a problem that Latin 
American diplomats foresaw, warned against, and opposed before and during the 1945 San 
Francisco conference. The key elements are regional specificity, previously agreed and 
transparent standards, an emphasis on early preventative diplomatic measures, and collective 
super-majoritarian responsibility, couched in language reaffirming the illegitimacy of unilateral 
and extraregional intervention that together are the bane of formerly colonized regions of the 
world. 
Finally, how should states with different levels of power relate to collective decisions and 
actions? The postwar Americas were as marked by power asymmetries as the current context, 
and the concern about the interventions of great powers was just as present. In addition to 
binding regimes to democracy and the protection of rights, the Larreta Doctrine sought to tie 
small, medium, and great powers alike to processes of collective decisionmaking, without special 
veto rights for the largest states. Naturally, Uruguay could not wholly prevent the United States 
from unilateral actions, but by privileging multilateral mechanisms in yet another field of action, 
it would further delegitimize any intervention that took place outside that context. Small and 
large would be bound by the decisions of the collective, at least legally and institutionally if not 
always in effect.  
The Larreta Doctrine may be a footnote of history, but its core proposals are of 
immediate relevance. As initially proposed, its life was short. However, it emerged from and 
furthered critical discussions on the relationship between domestic democracy and human rights 
and the regional international community. It helped make space for democratic and human rights 
clauses that gained greater force over the ensuing decades through inter-American human rights 
regimes and growing collective commitments to democracy (Meza Salazar 2002; Legler and 
Tieku 2010). It was, without a doubt, ahead of its time. The conditions that inspired Rodríguez 
Larreta’s proposal also complicated its path; democratic governance was too feeble and sparse, 
and the record of great power restraint too short. However, the episode provides a useful and 
largely unexplored attempt by a small state to persuade its neighbors to adopt a regional 
precommitment to collective protection of human rights and democracy, with the crucial caveat 
that it must be not only the weak state that commits, but powerful neighbors and indeed the 
whole region. As with R2P, it is ultimately impossible to separate the doctrine from 
considerations of power, both in terms of Uruguayan concerns about Argentina and the context 
of hemispheric asymmetry. Rodríguez Larreta and the ensuing debate elucidate possible 
responses to the dilemmas of (non)intervention, which some vulnerable states were ready to 
adopt. This is not because they were less jealous of their sovereignty or embraced 
interventionism, but because they conceptualized both quite differently. A collective regional 
decision to protect the democratic or human rights of a nation whose representatives had freely 
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